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Abstract 
Background: A management tool, called the Experience Feedback Committee, has been applied for patient safety 
and successfully used in medical departments. The purpose of this study was to analyse the functioning of an Experi-
ence Feedback Committee in a psychiatric department and to explore its contribution to the particular issues of 
patient safety in mental health.
Methods: We conducted a descriptive study based on all the written documents produced by the Experience Feed-
back Committee between March 2010 and January 2013. The study was conducted in Grenoble University Hospital in 
France. We analysed all reported incidents, reports of meetings and event analysis reports. Adverse events were classi-
fied according to the Conceptual Framework for the International Classification for Patient Safety.
Results: A total of 30 meetings were attended by 22 professionals including seven physicians and 12 paramedical 
practitioners. We identified 475 incidents reported to the Experience Feedback Committee. Most of them (92 %) had 
no medical consequence for the patient. Eleven incidents were investigated with an analysis method inspired by civil 
aviation security systems. Twenty-one corrective actions were set up, including eight responses to the specific prob-
lems of a mental health unit, such as training to respond to situations of violence or management of suicide attempts.
Conclusions: The Experience Feedback Committee makes it possible to involve mental healthcare professionals 
directly in safety management. This tool seems appropriate to manage specific patient safety issues in mental health.
Keywords: Risk management, Mental health, Neuropsychiatry, Quality improvement, Interdisciplinary 
communication
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Background
Patient safety has become a public health priority in 
the past 15  years since the publication of major epide-
miological studies on healthcare-related adverse events 
[1–5]. The last Canadian national study estimated that 
7.5 adverse events occurred for 100 hospital admissions, 
including a high proportion of preventable events and 
adverse events leading to death [6].
Even if many adverse events are similar in all medical 
units, there are specific patient safety issues in mental 
health. Indeed, neuropsychiatric units face events caused 
by behavioural problems such as violence, absconding, 
self-harm and suicide attempts [7–11]. Mental health 
adverse events result from multiple factors, mixing 
human behaviour risks and healthcare organizational 
weaknesses. Considering the lack of readily available 
information to guide patient safety systems in mental 
health, the improvement of management tools is essen-
tial to promote a patient safety culture among healthcare 
professionals [11–13].
Since the 1970s, civil aviation has developed operat-
ing experience feedback to improve passenger safety. 
Air transport safety systems require that any incident, 
even minor, must be treated by a systemic analysis 
within the air crew. Inspired by those security systems, 
Open Access
*Correspondence:  BBoussat@chu-grenoble.fr 
†Thierry Bougerol, Olivier Detante, Arnaud Seigneurin and Patrice François 
contributed equally to this work
2 Laboratory TIMC, UMR 5525, CNRS, Joseph Fourier University, Grenoble, 
France
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Page 2 of 7Boussat et al. Ann Gen Psychiatry  (2015) 14:23 
a specific mechanism, called the Experience Feedback 
Committee (EFC), was created in 2005 to analyse adverse 
events within a medical team. In France, the method 
was adapted to healthcare facilities with the help of Air 
France Consulting and was successfully implemented 
in an emergency department and a radiotherapy unit 
[14–19]. The EFC is a team composed of professionals 
representing the diversity of the functions encountered 
in the medical unit. The EFC members meet monthly to 
examine adverse events reported to their medical unit. 
An event requiring a thorough analysis is chosen at each 
meeting according to its severity and frequency and cor-
rective actions are suggested based on the results of the 
analysis. The main principles of the method are manag-
ing patient safety within a medical team and setting up 
corrective actions concerning latent factors that contrib-
uted to the occurrence of events or near-miss events.
The aim of this study was to describe the functioning of 
the EFC in a neuropsychiatric department and to discuss 
its contribution to the management of patient safety.
Methods
Study design
We conducted a descriptive study based on the written 
reports of the neuropsychiatric department EFC from its 
beginning in March 2010 until January 2013.
Setting
The study was conducted in a 1347-bed acute-care uni-
versity hospital. The neuropsychiatry department has an 
annual patient volume of 4800 stays.
Adverse events and near-misses affecting patients (such 
as nosocomial infections, technical complications, negli-
gence, diagnostic mishaps, therapeutic incidents, etc.) 
are reported by healthcare professionals, through a vol-
untary internal reporting system, to the hospital’s central 
safety unit using a standardized report form. This unit is 
composed of a medical doctor, a pharmacist and an engi-
neer specializing in quality management. The reports of 
events classified by severity and risk areas are presented 
during a weekly meeting involving representatives of the 
administration and professionals in charge of specific 
risk areas such as the risks associated with drugs (phar-
macovigilance), nosocomial infections (infection vigi-
lance), healthcare materials and devices (medical device 
vigilance), transfusion (haemovigilance), etc. The central 
safety unit directly investigates the most serious events 
and those involving several hospital departments. Other 
events are transmitted to the appropriate operator and 
to executives of relevant departments. For departments 
where an EFC has been implemented, the central safety 
unit addresses the reports of events to the EFC leader 
every month.
Neuropsychiatric department EFC
The neuropsychiatric department EFC was set up in 
March 2010 and works through a written procedure in 
accordance with the method proposed by Air France 
Consulting [17, 18, 20]. The Committee is composed 
of volunteer representatives of the various professions 
within the neuropsychiatric division. A few days before 
the committee meeting, the EFC leader receives a file 
with event reports concerning the neuropsychiatric divi-
sion. Committee meetings are conducted according to a 
standardized framework: (1) reading the list of reported 
events, (2) choosing a priority event to investigate by 
consensus according to the criticality of each incident, (3) 
choosing the professional responsible for the investiga-
tion, (4) reviewing the analysis made of the event chosen 
the previous month, (5) choosing corrective actions and 
(6) monitoring on-going actions. The investigation is car-
ried out during the month following the EFC by a desig-
nated person using a method, called ORION©, developed 
from methods of systemic analysis used in civil aviation 
and adapted to the healthcare domain by Air France Con-
sulting [14–17]. Previously trained investigators must 
follow the main steps of the ORION© method to fill out 
a standardized report (Additional file 1: Appendix): col-
lecting data and existing recommendations, describing 
the chronological facts that occurred before, during and 
after the event, describing the failures, looking for causes 
of errors and latent factors that could have contributed 
to the failures, setting up corrective actions and writ-
ing a report of the analysis. Causes and latent factors are 
sought in different areas such as political, organizational, 
working conditions, team functioning, procedures, actors 
and the patient.
Data collection
All written documents from the EFC of the neuropsychi-
atric division were analysed. The events reported were 
classified according to the source of the report, the type 
of event and the consequence for the patient using the 
International Classification for Patient Safety [21]. Writ-
ten reports from meetings were analysed using a stand-
ardized form that included the theoretical steps of an 
EFC meeting and the contents of the ORION© analysis 
(as described above). All documents were analysed by 
two independent investigators. Differences in rating were 
discussed until a consensus was reached.
Statistical analysis
We reported the characteristics of the EFC’s main func-
tioning (meetings and participants), the adverse events 
reported and the analysis reports as medians and inter-
quartile ranges (IQR; i.e., 25th and 75th percentiles) for 
continuous variables and number and percentages for 
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categorical variables. The analysis was performed using R 
version 3.0.1.
Results
The committee set up 30 meetings during the study 
period. A total of 22 professionals participated in the EFC 
(Table  1), including seven physicians, four head nurses, 
four auxiliary nurses, three nurses, one secretary, one 
physical therapist, one cleaning staff member and one 
quality engineer. The median number of attendants was 
eight (IQR 6–9) per meeting. A report was written for 
each meeting. Priority events were chosen in half of the 
meetings, analysis reports were presented and correc-
tive actions were decided in more than one-third of the 
meetings (Table 1). The previous corrective actions were 
monitored in 19 meetings (63.3 %).
A total of 475 reported incidents were transmitted 
to the EFC (Table 2). A median number of 12 incidents 
(IQR 7–20) were discussed per meeting. Incidents were 
mainly (97.1 %) reported by a professional of the depart-
ment and 93.3  % of them occurred inside the depart-
ment. Reported incidents concerned mainly clinical 
administration (29.3  %) (including incidents in patient 
identification, patient transfer, admission, discharge), 
behaviour (24 %) (concerning patient or staff) and patient 
accidents (12 %). The majority of incidents had no clini-
cal consequence for the patient (91.8 %) or the care pro-
cess (70.1 %). In 29 cases (6.1 %), the reported event had 
a mild or moderate consequence for the patient (Table 2). 
Among the 20 events involving a mild consequence for 
the patient, ten events were related to a patient fall, four 
events concerned violence against the staff or another 
patient, three events were related to inadequate equip-
ment and three events were suicide attempts. Among 
the nine events involving a moderate consequence, eight 
falls led to orthopaedic fracture or head trauma, and one 
admission error concerned a patient hospitalized in a 
corridor.
Fifteen priority incidents were chosen for investigation, 
including six incidents related to clinical administration, 
four incidents related to behaviour problems, four inci-
dents related to infrastructure and fixtures and one to 
the keeping of archives. Four incidents chosen were not 
investigated. Among the 11 analyses carried out, nine 
reports were written, whereas two reports were only oral 
(Table  3). Three reports involved a problem of coordi-
nation with other hospital departments. First, an error 
of emergency transfer was reported for a patient hospi-
talized in a corridor who was transported to the inten-
sive care unit for optimal surveillance because of loss of 
consciousness. Second, stretchers for an imaging exami-
nation emergency were recurrently unavailable. Third, 
organizational problems of the psychiatric consultation 
were reported. Three reports analysed adverse events 
associated with behavioural disorders: the inability of a 
professional to properly manage a patient with a suicide 
Table 1 Main functioning characteristics of the Experience Feedback Committee of the neuropsychiatry department
N = 22 %
Participants
 Physicians 7 31.8
 Head nurses 4 18.2
 Auxiliary nurses 4 18.2
 Nurses 3 13.6
 Secretary 1 4.5
 Quality engineer 1 4.5
 Physical therapist 1 4.5
 Cleaning staff member 1 4.5
Median number of participations per participant (IQR 25–75) 9 (5–15)
Median number of participants per meeting (IQR 25–75) 8 (6–9)
N = 30 %
Meetings
 Writing of minutes 30 100.0
 Listening to the events reported during the previous month 30 100.0
 Choosing a priority event to analyse during the following month 15 50.0
 Listening to the analysis report from the event chosen the previous month 11 36.7
 Deciding corrective actions 11 36.7
 Following up the previous corrective actions 19 63.3
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risk in child psychiatry, an attempted suicide by stran-
gulation with a phone cord and finally the investigation 
of repeated fugues in adult psychiatry. Three ORION© 
analyses were carried out to investigate a technical equip-
ment failure including an ECG machine, the computer 
network and a power failure. The last reports concerned 
a loss of patient records, a delivery mistake for special 
meals and the fall of an elderly patient.
The expertise of the written reports showed that the 
ORION© method was frequently followed. The chronol-
ogy of the facts and the identification of contributing or 
latent factors were described in 80 % of the cases. How-
ever, existing recommendations were only described in 
one-half of the cases. Twenty-six corrective actions were 
proposed by the professionals who performed the analy-
ses. The committee decided to implement 21 actions. 
Written guidelines (n = 11) were the most common type 
of action (see box). Other actions included staff training, 
improvement of the availability of material resources and 
a deeper analysis of an event in the context of a medical 
thesis. For example, the ORION© report related to the 
fall of an elderly patient showed several factors contrib-
uting to the event: some factors related to the patient 
(inappropriate behaviour of a patient with a depressive 
syndrome, decreased alertness and reflexes due to anxio-
lytic treatment) and organizational factors (lack of assess-
ment of the risk for falls at admission, lack of supervision 
due to a high level of department activity). The corrective 
actions selected were structured around these two main 
types of factors. A systematic screening of risk factors for 
falling at admission was established. Secondary preven-
tion actions were also decided: pharmaceutical adapta-
tion to reduce iatrogenic events and implementation of 
monitoring for high-risk patients by a team composed of 
a physiotherapist, an occupational therapist and a move-
ment therapist. Finally, adjustments were made at the 
facility level with adjustable-height beds, night lights in 
the rooms and more convenient showers.
Box Corrective actions set up
Guideline writing
 Inpatient transfer from ED
 Patient medical record management
 Suicide risk assessment at admission
 Management of patient with behaviour problems
 Security guards system
 Job profile of secretary
 Failing risk assessment at admission
 Protocol to prevent failing risk
 User manual for ECG advise
 Emergency consultation procedure
 Electrical failure procedure
Training
 Respond to situations of violence
 Management of elderly patients
 Respond to suicide attempt
 Proper management of medical records
Material resources
 Establishment of an isolation room
 Change of ECG device
 Loan of two ECG device
 Implementation of a planning software for inpatient transport
Research
 Completion of a medical thesis on inpatient transfers in the hospital
Discussion
This study highlighted that the EFC implemented in 
the mental health department functions routinely with 
patient safety incidents analysed and corrective actions 
set up. The EFC method, which was successfully imple-
mented in medical units, is also relevant to manag-
ing patient safety in mental health. Nath and Marcus 
Table 2 Characteristics of  the events reported during  the 
Experience Feedback Committee meetings
Characteristics N = 475 %
Incident type
 Clinical administration 139 29.3
 Behaviour 114 24.0
 Patient accidents 57 12.0
 Infrastructure/building/fixtures 41 8.6
 Medical device/equipment 30 6.3
 Resources/organizational management 30 6.3
 Nutrition 20 4.2
 Clinical process/procedure 16 3.4
 Medication/IV fluids 14 2.9
 Documentation 11 2.3
 Healthcare-associated infection 3 0.6
 Blood/blood products 0 0.0
 Oxygen/gas/vapour 0 0.0
Degree of Harm
 None, without care modification 343 72.2
 None, with care modification 103 21.7
 Mild 20 4.2
 Moderate 9 1.9
 Severe 0 0.0
 Death 0 0.0
Report provider
 Staff from the neuropsychiatric department 461 97.1
 Staff from another department 16 3.4
Place of the event
 In the neuropsychiatric department 443 93.3
 In another department 32 6.7
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demonstrated that some patient safety incidents and 
contributing factors are specific to mental health [11]. 
Although the EFC examined events that might have been 
found in other medical units, events specific to mental 
health were also reported and analysed. For example, sui-
cide attempts and missing person incidents were investi-
gated and the analyses highlighted several organizational 
flaws in suicide risk assessment, monitoring patients at 
risk and securing the department’s premises. Conse-
quently, actions concerning the security of the building 
and the assessment of suicide risk in child psychiatry 
(specific staff training to manage patients with violent 
behaviour and improved guidelines) were set up.
Considering patient safety incidents in mental health as 
a result of a complex set of contributing factors, the EFC 
provided a structured framework to analyse them within 
the department’s routine [8, 13, 22, 23]. The principle is to 
choose only one event per meeting to perform a thorough 
analysis using the ORION© method. As advocated by the 
Reason model, this method aims to identify factors related 
to the design of the system’s organization or the workplace 
environment rather than individual error [24]. The method 
implies the main steps of the Association of Litigation and 
Risk Management (ALARM) protocol but seems easier 
to use for healthcare professionals who are not specialists 
in risk management [25]. The essential contribution of an 
EFC is to provide a formal framework to correct the latent 
failures in the department’s organization.
Over the 3  years studied, the theoretical framework 
for conducting an EFC was not always followed. Indeed, 
the analysis of events did not always include all the steps 
defined in the ORION© method and the search for con-
tributing factors was often superficial. These deviations 
can be partly explained by the staff’s lack of time and 
availability. Carrying out the investigations to determine 
the causes of events as well as writing the report is time-
consuming. Inconsistent monitoring of the corrective 
actions previously set up resulted in the resurgence of 
certain patient safety incidents that had previously been 
investigated, highlighting the importance of monitoring 
corrective actions by the EFC. A low level of expertise 
in conducting the analyses may also explain these devia-
tions: only professionals involved in the EFC at its begin-
ning were given formal training, and additional training 
was not proposed afterwards. Consequently, regular 
training seems necessary to ensure the quality of meet-
ings and event analysis.
To function properly, the EFC requires reports of 
adverse events experienced by professionals. Several 
studies have shown that healthcare professionals, par-
ticularly physicians, agree with the importance of inci-
dent reporting and the concept of learning from errors 
[26, 27]. Nevertheless, in practice, many incidents are not 
reported [28, 29]. Self-report of patient safety incidents 
is hindered by several barriers such as time constraints, 
complex forms, fear of punishment, shame as well as 
lack of education and feedback [28, 30–33]. In the pre-
sent study, we were not able to estimate the proportion 
of unreported incidents. However, the committee had 
enough incidents to discuss every month. Mental health-
care professionals are probably informed more easily of 
the corrective actions set up and can observe their effects 
considering that reported incidents are analysed by pro-
fessionals in the department. Consequently, the existence 
of an EFC in a mental health department may improve 
incident reporting.
Psychiatric units provide global and coordinated care 
for patients through the involvement of many profession-
als. However, Priest and Borella [34] showed a higher risk 
of incidents due to the increasing distribution of patient 




 Written reports 9 81.8
 Oral reports 2 18.2
 Description of the data collection method 9 81.8
  Individual interviews 9 81.8
  Collective debriefing 1 9.1
  Files 5 45.5
  Area visits 6 54.5
 Description of the chronology of facts 9 81.8
 Description of existing recommendations 6 54.5
 Error identification 6 54.5
 Identification of contributing or latent factors 10 90.9
  Management 5 45.5
  Organization and procedures 7 63.6
  Working environment 6 54.5
  Teamwork 3 27.3
  Technical processes 5 45.5
  Professionals 4 36.4
  Patients 2 18.2
Corrective actions
 Proposed actions N = 26
  Staff Training 4 15.4
  Writing procedures 12 46.1
  Organizational changes 4 15.4
  Increasing material resources 5 19.2
 Decided actions N = 21
  With a professional in charge 14 66.7
   From the department 12 57.1
   From another department 2 9.5
  With a defined deadline 9 42.9
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care over multiple practitioners. One of the strengths of 
the EFC is to gather all categories of professionals work-
ing in the unit and reinforcing interprofessional collabo-
ration and promoting teamwork. This multidisciplinary 
approach also contributes to identifying system vulner-
abilities more easily [35].
This study had several limitations. First, the function-
ing of an EFC depends on the professionals involved 
and the study was conducted in only one department. 
Second, the reporting system based on self-reporting by 
healthcare professionals did not provide the proportion 
of unreported incidents and did not take into account 
the patient’s complaints that were treated by the hospi-
tal’s legal department. Consequently, we were not able to 
measure the impact of the EFC on the completeness of 
incident reports and more generally on the prevalence of 
adverse events. Third, the impact of the EFC on patient 
safety was not assessed using clinical outcomes. How-
ever, we assumed that corrective actions against identi-
fied vulnerabilities resulted in an improvement of patient 
safety, including an improvement in the patient safety 
culture among professionals attending the committee.
Conclusions
The EFC is a tool allowing the direct involvement of men-
tal health professionals to manage patient safety. This 
innovative management tool is adapted to the specific 
adverse events encountered in mental health. The theo-
retical framework for conducting an EFC was not always 
followed, suggesting the need for simplifying the method 
for professionals subject to tight time constraints.
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